Florida Journal of International Law
Volume 16

Issue 1

Article 15

March 2004

The Reform of the Latin American Judiciary
Jorge Santistevan de Noriega

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil

Recommended Citation
Santistevan de Noriega, Jorge (2004) "The Reform of the Latin American Judiciary," Florida Journal of
International Law: Vol. 16: Iss. 1, Article 15.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol16/iss1/15

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Santistevan de Noriega: The Reform of the Latin American Judiciary

REFORM OF THE LATIN AMERICAN JUDICIARY
Jorge Santistevan de Noriega*

When we discuss constitutions and the rule of law and the
independence of the judiciary, I must begin by saying that I come from a
country where constitutions and the judiciary have been systematically
manipulated by government and, in fact, the real exercise of constitutional
rights and the independence of the judiciary is something that we are still
fighting for. For an audience which is basically schooled in the common
law, I would like to refer to the changes in the constitutions of Latin
America. In general, since the 1980s and 1990s, all Latin American
constitutions have changed. In general the model that we have used on the
continent for these changes is the Spanish constitution of 1978. I am sure
that in Brazil they also used the constitution of Portugal, but in the other
countries, the Spanish constitution is conceived as the most democratic
and the most advanced, because it has a clear system of protection of
human rights, the civil liberties or fundamental rights, and also an
interesting system for the judiciary and institutions concerning the
judiciary. Certainly the Spanish constitution adopted the amparo, created
in Mexico and developed in Colombia as tutela, and in general these
Spanish constitutions had a lot of influence in our continent.
First of all, in all of our countries, we have the constitutional tribunal
apart from the supreme court. The constitutional tribunal is a European
creation by which a specific tribunal decides on the constitutionality of the
laws. So the constitutional tribunal is capable of repealing a law passed by
Congress when it is against the constitution. We have it in almost all of our
countries in addition to the supreme court. In some cases the constitutional
tribunal has also the power to decide on constitutional matters in
individual cases and with regards to certiorari, there are constitutions
which allocate this power to take up cases to the common tribunals to
decide for the constitutional tribunal.
Second, the ombudsman. The ombudsman is not truly a new creation,
it is an adaptation by the Spaniards of the Scandinavian institution. It is
conceived in Spain not only as supervising the administration in order to
redress the injustice produced by maladministration, but the ombudsman
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has also been given the task of protecting human rights. In general in Latin

America, with different names, we have adopted the institution of the
ombudsman or something similar.
As far as the judiciary is concerned, the Spaniards took up all the new
institutions in Europe to provide for independence in the judiciary.
Basically, the judiciary councils are independent organs with the task of
selecting the judges and electing or nominating them. The system that you
have in the United States in which the Justices of the Supreme Court are
appointed by the executive and ratified by Congress has been abandoned
in the modern European constitutions and is not generally in force in Latin
America. The reason is that such a system leads to the politicization of the
nominations of judges. Therefore, these judiciary councils are in place,
which are normally composed of representatives from the judiciary,
legislative, and executive, but which are totally independent. In some
cases, like in Peru, they also represent civil society, and some members are
elected by bar associations and universities. These judicial councils are
entrusted with the task of guaranteeing an independent judiciary by
systems of neutral selection. In addition to that are the judicial academies,
which are the bodies which exist to give special education to judges.
All of this has occurred in Latin America since the 1980s and 1990s,
together with the introduction of free market economy and the greater
flexibility that this new economy requires. In all Latin American countries

in general, judicial reforms have been promoted to adapt the judiciary to
the challenges of a new market economy, to make the judiciary work
efficiently and certainly to assure that the local population has access to
the judiciary. All financial institutions, like the World Bank, the
International Development Bank, UNDP, AID, even the German technical
corporation, have been promoting modernization, judicial reforms, real
codes with the goal of introducing a modern proceeding either in the civil
or in the criminal area.
Together with these reforms, whose results are not necessarily as
spectacular as they apparently are in Brazil, we are beginning something
like a new era of reforms. We are rethinking the reforms and we are trying
to see what things we are supposed to do. Most of the reforms of the
judiciary have not necessarily led to a better judicial system and certainly
the Center for Judicial Studies in Chile will have much more to say about
this. In addition to judicial reforms, we have introduced alternative
systems of dispute resolution - arbitration, and also mediation or
conciliation. In some cases, like in Argentina or Peru, mediation in civil
cases is mandatory but has very little success. In other cases, arbitration
has developed quite significantly, particularly when dealing with foreign
investment. I would say in Peru, my country, arbitration is working
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relatively well. We have gone so far as to include in the legislation that
every contract with the state and every purchase of goods and services in
the state goes to arbitration. This is a modern jurisdictional function, but
one which is now mandated by law.
Regarding big business and corporations and foreign investment, these
investments are generally protected under multilateral treaties or bilateral
treaties. We have abandoned the Calvo clause in Latin America, which is
this diplomatic protection to the investors that we had. During the
twentieth century, it was largely abandoned because under these
multilateral treaties and bilateral treaties, countries are supposed to be
taken to court directly by the investor. These cases are to be brought before
a local court, or to the International Arbitration Tribunals, in particular the
ICSID - International Center for the Settlement of Disputes - which is
promoted by the World Bank. ICSID has been working for quite some
time and it is very impressive. They have already decided 111 cases in
which the arbitrators have, in many cases, given the reason for their
decision to the investor. In other cases, fewer cases, they have given the
reason to the state which was taken to court.
Another new development in Latin America, particularly in Peru, is the
growing existence of the quasi-judiciary systems or, as we call them,
administrative courts. Courts from the administration within the agencies
actually perform a quite high judiciary role and I would say that if we look
at various countries in the region, the most important litigation is taking
place in these administrative courts and not necessarily in the judicial
system. Although exceptional cases may go to the judicial system through
amparo or through the constitutional remedies, these remedies are to
remedy the wrongdoings of the administrative court and not to decide
again or do not constitute an appeal to those cases.
Now the basic reforms that we are undertaking in Latin America are in
the area of criminal procedures. Under the influence of the Germans who
have the best criminal procedure, or at least have sold it to Latin America,
we are introducing the accusatory system to supercede the inquisitive
system that we inherited from the Spaniards. We are introducing the
ministerio publico, which is the public prosecutor, together with the public
defenders, and an oral proceeding in criminal cases. Almost all countries
in Latin America have adopted this new procedure, significantly
Guatemala, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile. The results have
varied, however, because it is difficult to just change the code and the
system and not change the culture. I am particularly impressed by the
experience of Chile. They decided to create the national prosecutor, the
ministerio publico, to introduce the new system, but did so progressively.
They have organized the implementation of the code according to the
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regions and incorporated it little by little. They are implementing this new
system which actually calls for a new culture, rather than simply a new
code.
On the different problems of judicial organization, and taking into
account the experience in Latin America that we've had with these
institutions developed from the constitution of Spain, there are some
conclusions that are based on the work of the judicial center in Chile that
one has to underline in a meeting like this. First of all, we are trying new
codes and new constitutions - in Peru we are redrafting the constitution
again, and soon we are going to have the thirteenth constitution in the
history of our country. New constitutions, new codes, new models. We can
have whatever we import, but if the political will is not present, then we
are going to make little progress, just as we have made little progress with
the reforms that were promoted by international organizations over the last
10 or 15 years. Certainly the way to make the political will real and
tangible is not through speeches or discourses or nice intentions but
budget. Our judiciaries need money, larger budgets. It was very clear from
Brazil and from Guatemala and from Mexico how the courts need more
money and that the most clear way of making sure that a political will
exists is the way in which the judiciary is given not only enough money,
but enough independence to handle their budgets.
Second, we may change codes and constitutions, but certainly we need
a new culture in Latin America vis-a-vis the judiciary. The basic problem
is the lack of trust that the judiciary has in vis-a-vis the local population.
Ambassador Jett, who has been in my country for many years and who has
played a significant role in the fight against dictatorship in Peru,
mentioned how poorly the courts and the judiciary perform in the polls. I
am afraid this is true in many countries of Latin America, with the
fortunate exception of Brazil. But this is only part of the problem. We need
to do something because it is not only a question of codes or of legal
education, but a question of promoting greater trust in the judiciary.
Certainly new systems like oral systems or perhaps alternative systems of
dispute resolution are going to help. A new trend which is interesting in
my country and in others in Latin America is the new role that the judges
themselves and the prosecutors are playing in judicial reform. They are
getting properly organized in associations or unions, not for their labor
problems or dispute but to play a role in the reform of the judiciary. In
taking the importance of these judges, in particular the new judges, I think
that these reforms will be carried out and the independence of the judiciary
is going to be significantly strengthened.
We have said very many things about the judiciary in our countries but
let us make clear, it is not only the judiciary. Almost all branches of
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government can be depicted as wrong and as awful as the judiciary. In
general we are not witnessing only a crisis in the judiciary but probably a
crisis of the state as it is conceived due to the many differences in terms of
income distribution.
Finally, the main thing in judicial reform is the role of civil society.
Certainly we say that we need more than codes and constitutions and a
proper education for the judges and budgets. We also need a role for civil
society and there is an ongoing discussion about how civil society is

supposed to participate in judicial reform, in the contribution to strengthen
the independence of the judiciary, and there are questions still to be asked.
First of all, what is civil society for this purpose? In general, in many
countries, civil societies are the human rights NGOs. I do not agree with
that because I basically think that in addition to the human rights NGOs,
civil society means the universities. The role of universities in judicial
reform seems to be most important; therefore, this university in this
bridging role with Latin America has a particular contribution to make in
terms of catalyzing the participation of universities in judicial reform. In
addition to that, bar associations in Latin America in general are more an
association to promote benefits for the lawyers and not the guardians of the
ethics in the profession, therefore, a new role for the bar associations
would be significantly important for the strengthening of the judiciary as
much as the growing participation of the judges and prosecutors
themselves in their own associations, the free press, the investors, the
entrepreneurs, and the private sector. In general the private sector are
supposed to be the best users, the greatest users of the judiciary, but at
least in my country, they pay very little attention to the independence and
the functioning of the system. Therefore, I think that there are different
avenues in terms of civil society and there are different roles that should
be perceived for this second wave of reforms that is taking place in Latin
America. I hope it is not going to be followed by a third wave in which we
will keep on discussing how many failures have taken place.
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